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Doctrines Regarding "The Fight Against
Impunity" and "The Victim's Right for the
Perpetrator to be Punished"
Jesds-Maria Silva Siinchez*
I. Introduction
Over the course of the last decade, particularly in recent
years, two doctrines have emerged within criminal law that
have a major bearing, in theoretical and practical terms,
namely, the doctrine of the fight against impunity1 or "zero im-
punity"2 and the doctrine of the victim's right for the perpetrator
to be punished.3 Both doctrines have different origins and like-
wise address differing motivations. However, they do share
common ground, for instance, when attempts are made to jus-
tify the right to combat impunity by referring to a victim's pre-
sumed right to justice, which is identified as the perpetrator's
punishment. This paper strives to look into both doctrines and
the purported interplays existing between them.
II. The Doctrine (or Doctrines) of the
Fight Against Impunity
2.1 Introduction
The first point that must be highlighted in relation to the
doctrines of the fight against impunity is the fact that said doc-
trines are highly prominent in both academic and forensic cir-
cles, as well as in public opinion.4 This good reputation is
largely due to the specific field in which they have been formed-
* Pompeu Fabra University.
1. DANIEL PASTOR, EL PODER PENAL INTERNACIONAL: UNA APROXIMACI6N
JURIDICA CRfTICA A LOS FUNDAMENTOS DEL ESTATUTO DE ROMA 75 (2006).
2. Id. at 80.
3. JAN PHILIPP REEMTSMA, DAS RECHT DES OPFERS AUF DIE BESTRAFUNG DES
TATERS-ALS PROBLEM (1999).
4. PASTOR, supra note 1, at 182-83. It should be noted, for instance, that orga-
nizations that defend human rights, such as Amnesty International, have adopted
many postulates of this ideology.
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crimes against humanity. It is also due to the bodies of law that
have developed them, international courts and national consti-
tutional courts; and lastly, to the source from which they have
been drawn, international treaties for the protection of human
rights.
Accordingly, preventing impunity has become the most
"contemporary" goal in criminal law and indeed one of the fore-
most factors leading to changes in the scope of traditional crimi-
nal justice principles 5 during the last decade. The duty of
States and the International Community to issue punishments
for the sole purpose of bringing an end to impunity is set out in
the Preamble to the Statute of the International Criminal
Court, the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights,6 judgments issued by constitutional courts, and a large
body of doctrinal papers. 7
Doctrines against impunity have unfolded within the
framework of transitional justice,8 as it is called. These doc-
trines advocate an unrestricted appeal to criminal law in the
face of the proposals of truth, compensation, and rehabilitation
for victims. Along these lines, not only do the doctrines throw
5. WOLFGANG NAUCKE, DIE STRAFJURISTISCHE PRIVILEGIERUNG STAATSVER-
STARKTER KRIMINALITAT 55, 76, 80-81 (1996) [hereinafter NAUCKE, DIE STRAFJURIS-
TISCHE]; Wolfgang Naucke, Normales Strafrecht und die Bestrafung
staatsverstarkter Kriminalitat, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR GVNTER BEMMANN 75, 82 (Joa-
chim Schulz & Michael Damnitz eds., 1997) [hereinafter Naucke, Normales
Strafrecht]; Ilse Staff, Zur Problematik staatsverstdrkter Kriminalitdt, in DAS
RECHT DER REPU1BLIK 232, 259 (Brunkhorst & Niesen eds., 1999). See also George
Fletcher, Justice and Fairness in The Protection of Crime Victims, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 547, 554-55 (2005) [hereinafter Fletcher, Justice and Fairness].
Fletcher approves of and notices that in new international instruments, the notion
of justice, seen as the victims' right for perpetrators to receive the punishment they
deserve, has taken precedence over the notion of a fair trial, seen as the perpetra-
tors' right to be treated respectfully regardless of the severity of the suspicions
directed at them.
6. Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154
(Sept. 26, 2006); Chumbipuma Aguirre et al. v. Peru Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 87 (Mar. 14, 2001) (both judgments declaring the respective defendant
countries were internationally liable). See also Kolk & Kiselyiy v. Estonia, Eur.
Ct. H.R. app. no. 23052/04 and 24018/04 (2006).
7. KAI AMBOS, A GENERAL PART OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 33 (2005);
see also George Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF.
CRiM. L. REV. 51, 60 (1999).
8. Jorg Arnold & Emily Silverman, Regime Change, State Crime and Transi-
tional Justice: A Criminal Law Retrospective Concentrating on Former Eastern
Bloc Countries, 6/2 EuR. J. CRIME, CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 140, 141 (1998).
866 [Vol. 28:865
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss4/11
FIGHT AGAINST IMPUNITY
out models of an unconditioned waiver of criminal law, they also
discard proposals allowing for either a conditional waiver of at-
tribution of criminal liability, for instance, a confession given
before truth committees, 9 or an otherwise conditional mitiga-
tion of liability in the case of confession.
2.2 The notion of "impunity" and the elements constituting
the doctrine of the fight against impunity
Etymologically, impunity simply means "lack of punish-
ment" and hence bears no negative connotation. Nonetheless,
the statements made in international courts define impunity as
the "general lack of investigation, persecution, detainment,
prosecution and sentencing of those who are liable for violating
protected rights."10 This definition gives the term "impunity" a
clearly negative connotation. Furthermore, within the afore-
said case-law notion, the concept of impunity1' refers to three
circumstances: (1) the lack of any kind of legal intervention by
the State in the facts (factual impunity),12 (2) the explicit limita-
tion of prosecution and punishment for those facts owing to ex-
emption laws stemming from democratic parliaments (active
legal impunity), and (3) non-annulment of said laws (legal im-
punity by omission).' 3
As a result, when developing the doctrine of the fight
against impunity, it has been stated that violations of human
rights are not eligible for amnesty, not subject to a statute of
limitations, and cannot be pardoned. Nor indeed can they be
governed by the double jeopardy interdiction (procedural non
bis in idem, res judicata) or by the principle of non-retroactive
application of unfavorable provisions. 14 I particularly find in-
teresting the doctrine's effect on double jeopardy. It has been
9. See David Crocker, Punishment, Reconciliation, and Democratic Delibera-
tion, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 509, 514, 531 (2002).
10. Almonacid, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 154, marg. no. 111.
11. See also Jorge Vifiuales, Impunity: Elements for an Empirical Concept, 25
LAW & INEQ. 115, 117 (2007).
12. This tends to occur when crimes are committed in the context of a political
regime that causes them or, at least, blinds people as to the fact they are being
committed.
13. Several countries have been in this situation following the passage of such
provisions and have even decided to render them null and void.
14. See, e.g., Almonacid, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 154 (judgment of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights dealing with established doctrine).
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rejected as an absolute right, denying a binding effect in rela-
tion to res judicata when the latter is "fraudulent" or "appar-
ent," or in other words when it: (1) adhered to the goal of
relieving the perpetrator of criminal liability, (2) was not
brought independently or impartially, and (3) was not intended
to submit the individual to justice. 15 Nevertheless, the new doc-
trine on the scope of the double jeopardy principle goes further.
It has been stated that a correct not guilty verdict loses the ef-
fect of res judicata when new facts or evidence subsequently
emerge on the grounds that "the demands of justice, victims'
rights, and the spirit of the American Convention trump the
protection of double jeopardy."16
The issue to address is whether said restriction, or even
eradication, of basic criminal law principles can be assumed. In
my opinion, it is necessary to make some distinction at this
point. Indeed, it is not the same to state that such crimes are
not eligible for amnesty, not subject to a statute of limitations,
and not subject to pardon, as it is to conclude that the principle
of non-retroactive application of unfavorable provisions and the
double jeopardy (res judicata) principle are not applicable in
this field. With regard to the former, it should be pointed out
that, strictly speaking, there is no right for crimes to be subject
to a statute of limitations. The strongest argument against
non-application of a statute of limitations 17 or the establish-
ment of long statutes of limitations is the consideration that it
is illegitimate to punish someone for crimes that took place a
long time ago, when the individual and indeed society have
changed substantially since then, because it harms human dig-
nity.18 However, the very doctrine allowing for a criminal stat-
ute of limitations founded on the notion that "time is the
greatest healer" may be challenged by the fact that certain
15. Id. at 154; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 20, July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
16. See Almonacid, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 154 at 154. See also Ple-
nary Council of the Constitutional Court of Colombia, C-554-01, May 30, 2001.
17. This argument can be defended from the standpoint of absolute justice.
See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMI-
NAL LAW DOESN'T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 58 (2006).
18. CARLOS SANTIAGO Nn.o, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL 182-83 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter NINO, RADICAL EVIL].
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wounds never heal. 19 All in all, an analysis of the perpetrator
and social evolution unavoidably shows that there is a point at
which the present becomes the past 20 and should not be subject
to intervention by the court in criminal proceedings. The issue
concerns how to determine the point at which the events have
indeed "faded into the past."21 Given that at this juncture it is
important to introduce degree considerations, intermediate so-
lutions may be justified in many cases.
What has been explained above can also serve to distin-
guish between eligibility for amnesty and for pardon. It is
widely known that there is a major difference between pardon
and amnesty. Pardon applies to an individual who has already
been sentenced and there is, therefore, a reason for the disap-
pearance of criminal liability. On the other hand, amnesty
takes place prior to criminal proceedings, where it blocks a
statement regarding said liability.22 This distinction consti-
tutes grounds for rejecting amnesty and accepting the possibil-
ity of a pardon instead. In the latter case, the existence of a
wrongful, blameful action on the part of the perpetrator and the
recognition of the injured party's victim status can be wholly
determined by the verdict, even if enforcement of the penalty
imposed is finally dispensed with.
As mentioned above, the issue of the championed irrele-
vance of the principle of "non-retroactive application of unfavor-
able provisions" is rather more significant. Generally speaking,
a distinction should also be made, even if merely for analytical
purposes, between the effect of said principle when indirectly
applied to an exempting provision such as an amnesty law, and
the effect brought about when the principle has a direct bearing
19. See RAMON RAGu s I. VALLS, LA PRESCRIPCI6N PENAL: FUNDAMENTO Y
APLICACI6N 91 (2004) (on the possible justifications for establishing that certain
crimes may not be subject to a statute of limitations, that is, for prolonging the
persecution of such crimes until the death of the alleged perpetrator).
20. Thomas Vormbaum, Mord sollte wieder verjdhren, in FESTSCHRIFr FEST-
SCHRIFT FUR GCNTER BEMMANN 481, 498 (Joachim Schulz & Michael Damnitz eds.,
1997).
21. See REGINA BLOMMEL, DER OPFERASPEKT BEI DER STRAFRECHTLICHEN VER-
GANGENHEITSBEWALTIGUNG 263 (2002) (stating the opposite proposition that peace
with the victim should be sought, though I believe that doing so should not be left
up to the latter).
22. See Carlos Perez del Valle, Amnistia, Constituci6n y Justicia Material, 61
REDC 187, 197 (2001).
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on a severe law such as that which subsequently extends the
statutes of limitations on certain crimes to the point that, effec-
tively, a statute of limitations cannot be applied.
First, the bearing of this principle with respect to amnesty
laws must be taken into consideration. 23 If such favorable pro-
visions, which were preceded and followed by an unfavorable
provision (the one provision that failed to acknowledge those
amnesty laws and the one provision invalidating them, respec-
tively), are in fact declared to be null and void, it cannot be
stated that the principle of non-retroactive application has been
breached if a punishment is ultimately issued. Even so, in or-
der to declare a favorable interim provision as null and void, its
material legitimacy must be challenged, a result which shall
stem from a judicial, not legal or constitutional, provision.24
From this standpoint, exempting provisions which bear
democratic legitimacy is an entirely different matter alto-
gether.25 In the case of such provisions, it becomes unfeasible to
apply the reasoning associated with annulment. 26 It is also im-
possible to overlook the consequences of non-retroactive appli-
cation of unfavorable provisions, unless the exempting
democratic law breaches the provisions of an international
treaty that has been ratified by a state beforehand (and was
once again null and void for that very reason). Aside from the
latter eventuality, overlooking the consequences of the principle
of non-retroactive application of unfavorable provisions may
only be upheld according to the viewpoint of those who believe
that principles generally acknowledged in international law
meet the requirements established by the legality principle in
criminal law27 and, likewise, that one such principle is the an-
23. See, e.g., NINO, RADIcAL EVIL, supra note 18, at 158; NORBERT CAMPAGNA,
STRAFRECHT UND UNBESTRAFTE STRAFTATEN 135-37 (2007).
24. This is a standpoint upheld by Nino, in the case of provisions passed with-
out democratic legitimacy. However, this would entail adopting an outsider's
standpoint, which cannot be backed up in terms of positivist viewpoints of legal
certainty. See NINO, RADICAL EVIL, supra note 18, at 163; WOLFGANG NAUCKE, DIE
STRAFJURISTISCHE, supra note 5, at 55 (putting forward weaker reasoning).
25. PASTOR, supra note 1, at 188.
26. NINO, RADIcAL EVIL, supra note 18, at 164 (accepting the need to dispense
with the sanction from the standpoint of punishment that is not retributivist, but
rather reasonable; nonetheless, the issue seems to transcend reasonableness and
concerns legal certainty and legitimacy of the ius puniendi).
27. Rome Statute, supra note 15, at arts. 21(1)(b), 22(3).
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nulment of exempting provisions whenever a violation of
human rights takes place, even if they are democratic and do
not constitute a breach of an international treaty.
In relation to the statute of limitations, one opinion main-
tains that an extension of such period, or even a statement
whereby a statute of limitations may not be applied once a
crime has been committed, does not pose legality problems. The
reason put forward is that the protection awarded by the princi-
ple of non-retroactive application of unfavorable provisions only
covers elements regarding the definition of the crime and not
the requirements for its prosecution. Moreover, it is alleged
that this retroactive extension of statutes of limitations would
account for the fact that it was impossible to prosecute crimes
during a certain period, which constitutes adequate grounds for
suspending statutes of limitations as they elapse. 28 As stated,
strictly speaking there is clearly no entitlement to a statute of
limitations for crimes. Nonetheless, once it has been estab-
lished, it would be difficult to deny that regulation of statutes of
limitations would constitute a safeguard for the perpetrator.
Accordingly, retroactive extension of statutes of limitations
would not be acceptable.
We come at last to the problem of the deprivation of block-
ing effects to final judicial resolutions. There is once again a
need to establish a distinction. In the event of a "fraudulent" or
"apparent" res judicata, it can be stated that the resolutions are
consciously illegal or, in any event, infringe procedural provi-
sions and should thereby be considered null and void. Conse-
quently, a new prosecution would not breach the principle of
non bis in idem. Nonetheless, this reasoning lacks all value in
the case of correct resolutions, whereby it emerges that new
facts or evidence have arisen. If this applies, it can merely be
confirmed that there has been a breach of the principle non bis
in idem, linked to the stability of judgments and, thereby, to
effective judicial protection as well.
2.3. The purpose of the doctrine against impunity
The purposes for fighting impunity for crimes against hu-
manity initially show some degree of formalism. Indeed, na-
28. NINO, RADIcAL EVIL, supra note 18, at 182-83.
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tional constitutional courts declare that States must combat
impunity in order to fulfill their international duties. 29 How-
ever, this must refer to ulterior grounds: why is it that situa-
tions of impunity (non-persecution for punishable acts;
enactment of exempting laws; or especially non-annulment of
the latter) breach international conventions on human rights?30
This is the juncture at which material reasons emerge. The In-
ter-American Court of Human Rights refers to the "victim's
right to justice," which is tied to their right to "the investiga-
tion, identification and trial of the responsible individuals."
The Court also refers to a "right to the truth," which is an inte-
gral part of the "right of the victim and his/her relatives to be
given clarification from the competent bodies of the State as to
the wrongful acts committed and the liable individuals by
means of the investigation and trial envisaged in articles 8 and
25 of the Convention."31 For this very reason, it is deemed that
exempting provisions would give rise to a defenselessness on
the part of the victim.
The first striking aspect of the foregoing argument is that it
does not contemplate deterrence of potential perpetrators or the
trust of potential victims. The duty to punish-rejecting impu-
nity-is affirmed on the basis of victims' "current" or "effective"
rights. The issue in these cases, therefore, is whether consider-
ation shall be given to a retributivist basis of the punishment.
We will address this matter in the second part of this paper.
For now, it is sufficient to merely state for the record that, by
and large, doctrines on retribution have not been crafted with
the crime victim in mind; rather, they have been developed on
the basis of the link between the act carried out by the perpetra-
29. In the case of resolutions issued by the Inter-American Court, such impu-
nity breaches article 18 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, and also articles 1, 8 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights.
See Ninth International Conference of American States, American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man art. 18, April, 1948, O.A.S.T.S. XXX; Organization of
American States, American Convention on Human Rights arts. 1, 8, 25, July 18,
1978, O.A.S.T.S. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
30. See PASTOR, supra note 1, at 187 (stating that, in principle, issuing pun-
ishment and failing to do so are part of the "possible world" of penal power).
31. Almonacid, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 154 at 150 (reiterating a well-
established doctrine, the judgment in this case underlines that the State has an
obligation to achieve the truth through judicial proceedings).
872 [Vol. 28:865
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tor and the applicable rule.32 It is worth highlighting at this
juncture that the foregoing paragraph mentions several inter-
mingled rights, the existence and scope of which should initially
be distinguished; for instance, the right to the truth, the right to
a trial, the right to justice, and the right to punishment.
It would be difficult to deny that there is a right for victims
and their relatives to discover the truth.33 The difficulty lies in
maintaining that said right can (and must) be met through
criminal proceedings. 34 In fact, criminal procedure reconstruc-
tions of events in the past do not seek to reveal the truth about
what took place; rather, they merely lay the foundations for at-
tributing liability. Consequently, critics are correct when they
argue that the truth stemming from attribution of blame is
somewhat restricted. 35 Even the truth drawn at truth commis-
sions is shrouded in significant restrictions, which can only be
overcome by means of open dialogue between honest, informed
interlocutors .36
The circumstances surrounding the right to justice are
somewhat different. Indeed, it seems that the natural setting
for the aims of justice is the trial. Thereby, the right to justice
encompasses a right to a trial. However, the very meaning of a
"right to justice" and how it can be met are two aspects that are
by no means obvious. One possibility is that the expression is
used to refer quite simply to the aims of whomever deem them-
selves to be victims, whereby they wish for that circumstance to
be declared in an objective, public manner. In order to address
this objective, the institution of blame arises first and foremost.
It has already been suggested that doubt can be cast over the
notion of selective blame since it brings about a simplification of
complex situations. Laying the blame at someone's door for an
act entails holding others free from all blame for said act, which
32. See Fletcher, supra note 7, at 54 (referring to the reinstatement of the
breached rule, deprivation of the unlawful advantage the perpetrator has gained,
etc.).
33. CAMPAGNA, supra note 23, at 154.
34. This is paramount. See DANIEL PASTOR, ZVERDAD, HISTORIA Y MEMORIA A
TRAV9S DE LA JUSTICIA PENAL? 35 (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).
35. See Jaime Malamud Goti, What's Good and Bad About Blame and Vic-
tims, 9 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 629, 641 (2005).
36. Id. at 646.
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may not be entirely fair.37 Nonetheless, the foregoing drawback
is in all likelihood outweighed by the moral benefits that pro-
ceedings offer when it comes to an expression of blame. By lay-
ing blame at the perpetrator's door, the party affected by the
actions of the former is established as the "victim," whereby the
dignity and equality of the latter are reinstated.38
The issue to address is what the statement of a right to
punishment adds to the above, in the sense of inflicting harm.
It would appear that it has to do with the particular expressive
value that the perpetrator's suffering of pain provides in the re-
establishment of the victim's original position in cases of a
breach of human rights. However, it is difficult not to observe
in that process an aim to rationalize (or conceal) a pure desire
for revenge. As this should be dealt with in general terms, it is
worth at this point to refer the reader to the second part of this
paper.
2.4. Balance
In spite of what has been indicated, the doctrines of fight
against impunity encounter very little opposition. It has been
occasionally stated that the development of a social conscience
with respect to violations of human rights depends more on the
exposure and condemnation of such breaches, rather than on
the number of individuals effectively punished for them.39 Even
in this latter case, on the whole, this opposition is mostly a
strategic move. It is for this very reason that it has been
pointed out that imposing a responsibility on States (interna-
tionally) to prosecute and sentence breaches of human rights,
which occurred during a previous political regime, would be a
far too difficult a burden for governments who have to tackle
the difficulties entailed by re-establishing democracy. Hence,
this viewpoint does not stand against one international (or for-
eign) jurisdiction intending to take on a fight against impunity
37. Id. at 634, 641. But see Crocker, supra note 9, at 521 (maintaining that
exclusion of collective liability through compensation is precisely the only factor
that can put an end to the cycle of revenge).
38. See Goti, supra note 35, at 636, 639-40.
39. Carlos Santiago Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights
Put into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619, 2630 (1991).
874 [Vol. 28:865
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss4/11
FIGHT AGAINST IMPUNITY
by rejecting amnesties or statutes of limitations. 40 The proposal
is thus for the international community to assume active pro-
tection of human rights by providing (possibly unrestricted)
punishment of violations thereof.
The most striking exception to this state of affairs is illus-
trated in the study conducted by Daniel R. Pastor on interna-
tional criminal jurisdiction. It highlights how the ideology of
the fight against impunity (which he denotes as the "infinite
punishment" doctrine) is covered by courts, which, like the In-
ternational Criminal Court, act as prima ratio in the interna-
tional legal system and are predestined to convict. 41 It also
addresses how this causes a major decay in criminal law found-
ing principles and how there is a risk that certain aspects of the
fight against impunity end up being extrapolated to encompass
criminal law as a whole. We will address this latter aspect
below.
III. Permanent Aspects
It would be wrong to state that doctrines against impunity
only represent an exceptional law directed to combat an excep-
tional type of criminality.42 They have a far greater scope, en-
compassing crimes other than those associated with state or
state-related criminality; in particular terrorism, and more gen-
erally crimes against life. Indeed, there is no particular reason
to believe that the notion-and its implications-may not be
applicable to other serious crimes in internal laws.43 When am-
nesty laws are rejected based on the argument that they consti-
tute ad hoc legislation and that they entail prolongation of
impunity, valid statements are made with respect to amnesty
as a whole. Stating that amnesty or similar laws lead to de-
fenselessness on the part of victims and their relatives, who
would be denied the right to seek justice via effective means,
40. Id. at 2639. See also NNo, RADicAL EVIL, supra note 18, at 149, 186 (reit-
erating previous point and expanding it to encompass cases of terrorism and drug
trafficking).
41. See PASTOR, supra note 1, at 75, 129, 175.
42. However, sometimes reasoning put forward for the need for 'historical jus-
tice' following a change of political regime can lead to the establishment of excep-
tions to the general principles of criminal law in terms that could not be applied to
all crimes as a whole.
43. See PASTOR, supra note 1, at 176 (addressing the "metastasis effect").
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once again picks up on an argument that may be applied gener-
ally and would therefore apply to amnesty that would favor
members of a terrorist organization, a statute of limitations on
crimes committed by a serial killer, or a pardon for any serious
common crime. 44 In other words, based on such laws it can be
maintained that serious violent crimes shall not be eligible for
amnesty, pardoned, or subject to a statute of limitations. This
is clearly illustrated by the difficulties entailed when attempt-
ing to define the statute of limitations for murder and at the
same time stating that genocide may not be subject to a statute
of limitations. 45 Nonetheless, neither the statute of limitations,
nor the pardon or even amnesty46 necessarily lead to a second
victimization which would make them unacceptable from the
standpoint of victims' dignity.47
In any event, one only needs to examine political dialectics,
the discourse put forward by victims' associations and the me-
dia, in order to notice the omnipresence of notions associated
with the fight against impunity doctrine. This makes it possible
to state that its terms mark a trend of evolution in criminal law
at the turn of the 21st century. This trend (as with its manifes-
tation which it intimately tied to the repression of crimes
against humanity) is at least partly related to the established
foundation of criminal law, whereby it revolves around the vic-
tims of crimes. This trend also encompasses the governing cri-
teria relating to the existence of a (presumed) right of the
victim-especially the victim of a violent crime-for the perpe-
trator to be punished.
As we have seen, the core element of doctrines against im-
punity in criminal law involves "delivering justice to victims" by
prosecuting and punishing perpetrators. As a result, these doc-
trines stand against all those law principles and institutions
which, as an expression of some degree of focus in criminal law
on the perpetrator or on society in general, lead to either the
44. See Vifluales, supra note 11, at 126, 134 n.60.
45. See Vormbaum, supra note 20, at 500 n.96.
46. See, e.g., P~rez del Valle, supra note 22, at 203 (maintaining that the op-
portunity for amnesty based on a distributive perspective, provided it is fair, does
not constitute a breach of the international responsibilities taken on by the State,
nor does it affect trust in the fact that the requirements of law in achieving com-
mon good would still be valid).
47. CAMPAGNA, supra note 23, at 159.
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eradication of criminal liability for said perpetrator or a waiver
of enforcement of the penalty. Given a wrongful and blameful
act, arguments that may lead to the conclusion that it does not
meet the crime definition-and, indeed,, these are most of the
arguments giving rise to the exemption from punishment-are
rejected inasmuch as they constitute hurdles when it comes to
delivering the justice that victims seek and deserve. Argu-
ments that would lead to the reduction of the sentence to be
effectively served are equally rejected.
The issue that remains open, however, is whether delivery
of justice to the victim requires the perpetrator to effectively be
punished in all cases. Along these lines, it is not easy to main-
tain that the victim or society has a legitimate claim for punish-
ment that is absolute in nature. As mentioned, victims and
society have a right to the reinstatement of dignity and the so-
cial bonds put at stake by the crime, respectively. 48 However,
one must consider whether this is not inherent to declaring the
perpetrator's blame (and the respective declaration whereby the
victim is identified as the party affected by said perpetrator).49
Inasmuch as a victim's dignity can be reinstated-giving said
party the acknowledgment due-by inflicting the least degree of
harm possible on the perpetrator, it seems that this is a goal
that the criminal law system should indeed focus on
achieving.50
It is my view that the situation will not change significantly
if the problem is tackled by overlooking the victim's viewpoint
and incorporating the logic of positive general prevention. It is
widely known-disregarding the nuances that are characteris-
tic of the numerous variants of the doctrine-that this theory
identifies the penalty as a communicative message stating that
society continues to place its trust in the breached rule, impos-
ing harm on the perpetrator.51 In actual fact, this line of rea-
48. Id. at 66-67.
49. Crocker, supra note 9, at 519 (Crocker accepted this and stated "the trial
affirms the dignity of the victim.").
50. JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN
THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 124 (1990).
51. See Marcelo A. Sancinetti, Las Leyes Argentinas de Impunidad y El Ar-
ticulo 29 de la Constituci6n de la Naci6n Argentina, in 1 DOGMATICA Y LEY PENAL:
LIBRo HOMENAJE A ENRIQUE BACIGALUPO 811, 814 (Jacobo L6pez & Miguel Bajo
eds., 2004).
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soning merely forms a convincing basis for the need for a
crime-indeed, any crime-to be superseded by a penal reac-
tion. This penal communication "at the expense of the perpetra-
tor,"52 however, does not have to inflict harm on the perpetrator
through the enforcement of a penalty. Accordingly, I believe
that it cannot be deduced from this punishment theory that "a
lack of punishment for a breach of human rights is in itself an
abuse of human rights."53 The same would apply to any other
serious crime and, even so, it does not seem that, generally
speaking, any provision exempting the blameful perpetrator
from liability can be considered unfair. By the same token, one
cannot conclude without the inclusion of further premises that
"in the face of certain kinds of crimes, social order cannot allow
for pardon. ''54 Indeed, it would be necessary to draw the same
conclusion for other serious crimes. Consequently, the need for
"penal harm" is not tied to the need for an ideal confirmation
that the rule still holds. Rather, it relates to the requirement
that the law provide actual and potential victims with cognitive
safety. It is this aspect, and not the previous one, that we
should examine in greater detail.
According to the idealistic standpoint that is shared by pos-
itive general prevention theorists, one can perfectly maintain
that a pardon-inasmuch as it recognizes the wrongfulness of
the act and the culpability of the perpetrator 55 whilst also eradi-
cating both-is a functional equivalent to the penalty. With
good reason it has been mentioned that this constitutes "the
highest expression of reciprocal acknowledgment." 56 However,
one does not need to be party to this philosophical standpoint in
52. Clearly I am not suggesting by this that under application of the Full Stop
Law and the Law of Due Obedience that the elements of this penal disclo-
sure-which, besides necessary-were present.
53. Sancinetti, supra note 51, at 815.
54. Id.
55. For an expression in terms of likelihood, see CARL LUDWIG VON BAR, GES-
CHICHTE DES DEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHTS UND DER STRAFRECHTSTHEORIEN, 312
(Scientia Verlag 2d prtg. 1992) (1882) (describing how legal rights are expressions
of society's morals).
56. See GEORG W. F. HEGEL, PHANOMENOLOGIE DES GEIsTEs 493 (1986) (1806)
(the "Verzeihung" constitutes the "hochste Stufe der wechselseitigen Anerken-
nung"). See also Kurt Seelman, Ebenen der Zurechnun, in ZURECHNUNG ALS OPER-
ATIONALISIERUNG VON VERANTWORTUNG 85, 91 (Mattias Kaufmann & Joachim
Renzikowski eds., 2004) (quoting GEORG W. H. HEGEL, PHANOMENOLOGIE DES
GEISTES 493 (1806) (1986)).
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order to support the fact that, just as with punishment, pardon
can also bring the seemingly irreversible blame to an end.57
IV. The Doctrine of the "Victim's Right for the
Perpetrator to be Punished"
4.1. Introduction: Victims' rights and the responsibilities
of states
Neither constitutions nor penal codes make specific refer-
ence to a presumed 'right of the victim for the perpetrator to be
effectively punished' for the wrongful blameful act committed
against the former. As a result, the issue may only be tied to
the presumed existence of a 'responsibility on the part of the
State' to punish certain crimes. A breach of this duty may en-
tail the State becoming liable on an international scale. As
mentioned, the doctrine of a fight against impunity is founded
on the fact that international instruments for human rights
protection base themselves substantially on the existence of
such a duty when declaring that certain serious breaches of
these instruments are neither eligible for amnesty nor subject
to a statute of limitations. However, attempts have already
been made to highlight the fact that the basis of this interna-
tional responsibility to hand down effective punishments for
certain crimes,58 presumably addressing victims' entitlements,
are not strong enough. The following paragraphs strive to ex-
amine this aspect in greater depth, addressing the terms of the
doctrine of the 'victim's right for the perpetrator to be punished.'
4.2. Victim's right for the perpetrator to be punished
Stating that victims have a right to ensure the perpetrator
is punished initially seems to be an attitude of criminal law that
smacks of 'an eye for an eye,' whereby private revenge bears a
clear implication of satisfaction. On the other hand, public
criminal law has historically intended to neutralize the victim.
Indeed, it is common knowledge that in recent decades, owing to
the boom in victimology, the role of the victim in a criminal law
57. Jaime Malamud Goti, Emma Zunz, Punishment and Sentiments, 22 QUIN-
NIPLAC L. REV. 45, 58 n.28 (2003) [hereinafter Goti, Emma Zunz].
58. This is clearly only possible in the context of a new approach to the notion
of sovereignty.
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monopolized by the State re-emerged. Nonetheless, no one
could envisage that in this context the notion that victims have
a right for the perpetrator to be punished would re-emerge with
substantial force. Indeed, everything points to the fact that the
individual responsible for said re-emergence was Jan Philipp
Reemtsma, a wealthy German intellectual, who was taken hos-
tage in 1996.
After telling of his experience as a hostage in the book Im
Keller,59 in a short space of time Reemtsma published two fur-
ther texts detailing his viewpoint.60 On the basis of the desire
for revenge (or resentment) the victim feels towards his perpe-
trator, he states that public criminal law must not be instru-
mentalized to this end.61 Nonetheless, he warns that there is
still something that it can and should do: specifically, prevent
the continuation of moral damage sustained by the victim. If it
is not declared that the events should not have occurred, said
damage shall persist. Indeed, this does not mean that the pro-
cedural intervention shall suffice in order to eradicate the vic-
tim's subjective trauma caused by the act carried out; however,
it does at least hinder objective continuation of moral damage.62
The process for laying charges demonstrates to the victim that
said individual was in no way responsible for the act committed,
and that said individual has not suffered on account of a natu-
ral occurrence or swing to chance, but rather due to the blame-
fulness of a perpetrator.63 When the latter is punished, the
victim thus achieves reintegration back into society.64
This is similar to the approach laid down by Fletcher, who
states that once carried out, a crime prolongs its effects creating
a situation whereby the perpetrator exercises dominance over
the victim. 65 It is also similar to the approach of K. Giinther, for
whom the most decisive aspects are the permanent pain and
59. JAN PHILLPP REEMTSMA, IM KELLER (1997).
60. REEMTSMA, supra note 3; WINFRIED HASSEMER & JAN PHILIPP REEMTSMA,
VERBRECHENSOPFER: GESETZ UND GERECHTIGKEIT 112 (2002).
61. HASSEMER & REEMTSMA, supra note 60, at 122.
62. REEMTSMA, supra note 3, at 27; HASSEMER & REEMTSMA, supra note 60, at
131-34; see also Giinter Jerouscheck, Straftat und Traumatisierung: Uiberlegungen
zu Unrecht, Schuld und Rehabilitierung der Strafe aus viktimologischer Perspek-
tive, 55 JZ 185, 193 (2000).
63. HASSEMER & REEMTSMA, supra note 60, at 161.
64. REEMTSMA, supra note 3, at 24, 26-27.
65. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 57.
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humiliation to the victim caused by the crime.66 For all of them,
the role of punishment is to reinstate the equality between the
perpetrator and the victim that had been upset by the crime.67
According to Reemtsma, this would fit in perfectly with the the-
ory that favors the reinforcement of the breached rule as a vari-
ant for positive general prevention: the victim's interest would
account for the subjective factor. 68 Indeed, Fletcher states that
his is similar to Hegelian reasoning, the only difference being
that where the latter places the rule, the former places the vic-
tim. 69 On the other hand, for Ginther this goes beyond retribu-
tion and prevention, according to the manner in which they
have traditionally been conceived. 70
An issue that remains is whether reintegration into society,
the annulment of dominance or compensation for the humilia-
tion that the victim has undergone, 71 specifically requires the
perpetrator to be excluded and subjected to harm (enforcement
of punishment) rather than being publicly declared as blame-
worthy. 72 There is no consensus along these lines. While the
approaches advanced by some suggest that a declaration of
guilt provides sufficient compensatory means,73 others call for
"penal harm" (effective punishment), deeming that it is the only
method that provides a material explanation of the notion we
66. Klaus Ginther, Die symbolisch-expressive Bedeutung der Strafe, in FEST-
SCHRIFr FOR KLAus LODERESSEN 205, 207 (Michael Baurmann et al. eds., 2002);
see also Goti, Emma Zunz, supra note 57, at 54 (highlighting this emotional factor
by positing that the penalty plays the role of putting an end to the victim's feelings
of inferiority, humiliation, and shame).
67. If the State fails to do so, not fulfilling its duty to hand down punishment,
it is allowing for continuation of the situation of dominance (impunity) and be-
comes an accessory to it. See Fletcher, supra note 7, at 61.
68. HASSEMER & REEMTSMA, supra note 60, at 137.
69. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 58.
70. See Cornelius Prittwitz, The Resurrection of the Victim in Penal Theory, 3
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 125 (1999) (interpreting Reemtsma, supra note 3,
Prittwitz formulates it as a theory of positive special prevention, focused on the
victim).
71. See id. at 128 (stating, in more general terms, the positive effect of punish-
ment on the victim).
72. See Klaus Luderessen, Der 5ffentliche Strafanspruch im demokratischen
Zeitalter-Von der Staatsrason iiber das Gemeinwohl zum Opfer?, in STRAFRECHT-
SPROBLEME AN DER JAHRTAUSENDWENDE 63, 63 (Cornelius Prittwitz & loanis Ma-
noledakis eds., 2000) (discussing whether a victim can experience satisfaction
through punishment by the state).
73. See Ginther, supra note 66, at 219.
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wish to convey in our social setting.74 This point runs counter to
the stance held by some who maintain that the sole objective
that victims can pursue must be channeled through civil and
legal procedures that address said victim's needs more closely,
and likewise the procedures of social protection laws.75
Those who demand effective punishment of perpetrators as
a factor that is paramount to ensuring criminal law is focused
on the victim, can indeed openly talk of a right of the victim for
the perpetrator to be punished. In actual fact, they are stating
that effective punishment becomes legitimate even though
there are no preventive grounds for its imposition. Indeed, this
would cause the State's right to impose it (a genuine ius
puniendi) to fade. The victim's right for the perpetrator to be
punished would thus become a right of the victim versus the
State, which would result in responsibility on the part of the
latter. On the other hand, the remaining perspectives should
simply address the victim's interest in a trial being followed in
order to establish the perpetrator's blame. Nevertheless, this is
also a significant factor. On this basis it can be stated that the
victim is drawn into a situation of competition with the perpe-
trator when it comes to determining the scope of criminal law
principles, since they could no longer be unilaterally deemed as
providing assurance for the latter, but also for the former.76
4.3. Final clarifications on the notion of "victim" and his/her
"rights"
When confronted with the discourse on a victim's right to
the truth, to proceedings or to punishment, the first striking el-
ement is resorting to the very term "victim." In standard lan-
guage, one talks of victims even before proceedings have been
brought-and indeed a declaration has been issued-as to the
existence of at least a wrongful (and beyond a doubt, blameful)
act. In legal terms, this is nonsensical. Before a wrongful (and
74. Tatjana H6rnle, Die Rolle des Opfers in der Straftheorie und im materiel-
len Strafrecht, JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 950, 956 (2006).
75. See Klaus Luderssen, Opfer im Zwielicht, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR HANS JOA-
CHIM HIRSCH 879, 889 (Thomas Weigend & Georg Kipper eds., 1999) (putting forth
the paradigmatic view).
76. See Knut Amelung, Auf der Rickseite der Strafnorm: Opfer und Norm-
vertrauen in der strafrechtlichen Argumentation, in MENSCHENGERECHTES
STRAFRECHT: FESTSCHRIFT FUR ALBIN ESER 3, 6 (Jorg Arnold et al. eds., 2005).
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beyond a doubt, blameful) act is ascertained, there cannot be a
victim; rather, at the very most, one can talk of an "alleged"
victim. 77 In effect, one does not become a victim (in the sense of
the criminal law) on account of suffering harm,78 but rather due
to having suffered unlawful damage, which can only be deter-
mined during proceedings. 79 It may also be considered that the
injuries caused by non-blameful parties do not, strictly speak-
ing, give rise to victims (as subjects whose dignity has been af-
fected by the crime). In any event, this clarification is
significant because it highlights the fact that what is sometimes
laid down as a right for victims would merely constitute a right
for alleged victims. It likewise underlines the fact that victims
rights can only be referred to with respect to rulings passed sub-
sequent to it being declared that the act was unlawful. Most
importantly, it would be prejudicial to talk of victims prior to (or
during) the process.
The alleged victim, who is bestowed the right to an action,
clearly has an interest in a trial being held to establish the per-
petrator's blame, and also, if a wrongful blameful act is ascer-
tained in addition to the other circumstances for the imposition
of a penalty, said victim has an interest in punishment taking
place. The purpose of his or her right is thus for the legal rules
that regulate the exercise of ius puniendi to be applied by the
State. For this reason, the victim also has a right to appeal.
However, this right for the law to be applied cannot be equated
with a material right for punishment which would be beyond
such laws.
The theory of criminal law focused on the victim is not re-
tributivist80 or preventive in nature, at least not in the tradi-
tional sense. Accordingly, it can be deemed as restorative and
providing balance or equality. It does not focus on the past or
the future, but rather on the present. The trial and sentence
seek to put an end to the victim's situation of dominance, humil-
iation, or subordination, by reinstating said individual's origi-
77. Contra Fletcher, Justice and Fairness, supra note 5, at 549.
78. See id. (acknowledging this assertion).
79. Detlef KrauB, Tdter und Opfer im Rechtsstaat, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR KLAUS
LODERESSEN 269, 271 (Michael Baurmann et al. eds., 2002) (arguing from the
standpoint of a presumption of innocence).
80. See Michael Moore, Victims and Retribution: A Reply to Professor Fletcher,
3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 65 (1999).
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nal status. However, this means that the theory of criminal law
focused on the victim is centered on neutralizing the perma-
nent, moral damage that the victim continues to suffer as a re-
sult of the crime. This likewise implies that the core of said
theory should be formed by symbolic and expressive (moral) re-
sponses: a declaration of blame and a guilty verdict.81 The fur-
ther infliction of penal harm on the perpetrator would only be
justified when there are also preventive grounds for doing so
(especially involving cognitive assurance). Furthermore, the
imposition and enforcement of a penalty that is not related to
the aforementioned grounds, and is justified on account of the
victim's needs, would merely constitute institutional revenge
hiding under the veil of apparent rationality.
81. See CAMPAGNA, supra note 23, at 13 (expressing a view shared by many
scholars recently).
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